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NO. 6 FEBRUARY 2020 Introduction 
Turkey Shifts the Focus of Its 
Foreign Policy 
From Syria to the Eastern Mediterranean and Libya 
Günter Seufert 
On 27 November 2019, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey 
had concluded a treaty on military assistance and cooperation with the government 
of Fayez al-Sarraj in Libya. The agreement permits the deployment of Turkish troops 
into the civil-war-torn country. The announcement was met with almost unanimous 
criticism in Western Europe. The indignation grew even greater when it became known 
that Turkey was controlling and financing the smuggling of Islamic Syrian fighters into 
Libya. Reports of a dominant influence of the Muslim Brotherhood on the Libyan gov-
ernment seemed to complete the picture of a strongly Islamist-motivated Turkish policy. 
However, Turkey’s engagement in Libya is not driven by ideology, but rather by stra-
tegic considerations and economic interests. Ankara is thus reacting to its isolation in 
the eastern Mediterranean, where the dispute over the distribution of gas resources is 
intensifying. At the same time, Turkey is drawing lessons from the war in Syria. An-
kara has lost this war, but through its engagement in Syria, it has been able to estab-
lish a conflictual – but viable – working relationship with Russia. The bottom line is 
that Turkey’s commitment to Libya is a shift in the focus of its foreign policy from the 
Middle East to the Mediterranean, a shift that will present entirely new challenges to 
Europe, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). 
 
On 15 January 2020, The Guardian reported 
that Turkey has so far deployed 650 irregular 
fighters to Libya, members of the so-called 
Syrian National Army, which is a union of 
armed opposition groups created by Turkey. 
Another 1,350 had also been withdrawn 
from Syria and were being prepared in Tur-
key for deployment to Libya. Turkey is with-
drawing fighters from Syria, although the 
fighting there continues and Turkish troops 
are still being deployed to the country. 
There Is Little to Gain in Syria 
In Ankara, the ruling Justice and Develop-
ment Party (AKP) has buried its hopes of 
bringing the likeminded Muslim Brother-
hood to power in Syria and then using the 
country as a gateway for Turkish power 
projection in the Middle East. For Turkey, 
what remains to be done is to prevent 
Syrian Kurds from re-establishing the self-
governing structures in the north-west and 
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north-east of Syria that Turkish troops de-
stroyed during invasions in 2018 and 2019. 
Already at the beginning of the Astana pro-
cess – the series of conferences launched 
by Russia, Iran, and Turkey in December 
2016 to end the Syrian war – Ankara offi-
cially refrained from overthrowing Bashar 
al-Assad. On 21 December 2016, Turkey 
committed itself in Moscow to support the 
Syrian government in reaching an agree-
ment with the armed opposition. 
Although Erdoğan still presents him-
self to voters as being unyielding towards 
al-Assad, Turkey confirmed a meeting 
between the heads of the Syrian and Turk-
ish secret services in Moscow on 13 January 
2020. At the meeting, Ankara urged the 
Syrians to agree on a common strategy in 
the fight against Syria’s autonomy-seeking 
Kurds. Even prior to that meeting, the Turk-
ish side had conceded several times that it 
considers the presence of its troops in Syria 
to be temporary. 
Lessons from the Syrian War 
The AKP had to draw a number of painful 
lessons from the war in Syria, both from 
the war’s course and its outcome. First, 
contrary to expectations, there are no cases 
in which the Arab upheaval has led to the 
rule of parties that are ideologically close 
to the AKP. On the contrary, in Cairo and 
Damascus, secularist regimes are again – 
or still – in power. These regimes do not 
trust Ankara because of its support of the 
Muslim Brotherhood. This also applies to 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, 
which have declared the Muslim Brother-
hood a terrorist organisation. Thus, the 
dream is over that Turkey could rise to 
become the leading power of like-minded 
Arab states. Second, due to the decline 
of Syrian statehood, Syria’s Kurds have 
become political and military actors. This 
development has revived Turkey’s deep-
rooted fear of Kurdish separatism and made 
Ankara once again the defender of the status 
quo in the Middle East. This turn in its 
policy has enabled the AKP to close ranks 
with the old elites of the security bureau-
cracy, who have always taken a hard line 
towards Greece and Cyprus. Third, Syria’s 
Kurds have only been able to develop into a 
power factor due to their alliance with the 
United States. As a result, the government 
paints Washington as the primary threat to 
the survival of the Turkish state, and large 
segments of the population have come to 
adopt that viewpoint. This is grist for the 
mills of so-called Eurasianist circles, which 
demand that Turkey turn its back on the 
West for good. Fourth – despite all the set-
backs – it is primarily due to its coopera-
tion with Moscow that Ankara is still an 
actor in Syria. Without the approval of the 
Kremlin, Ankara would not have been able 
either to invade Afrin in the north-west of 
Syria in 2018, nor to send troops into the 
north-east of the country in 2019. More-
over, without Turkey’s rapprochement with 
Moscow and without the concomitant con-
cern of the United States and its NATO part-
ners about losing Turkey, Ankara would 
probably not have succeeded in October 
2019 in persuading Washington to severely 
restrict its cooperation with the Kurds and 
to initiate the withdrawal of US troops from 
Syria. Fifth, in Syria, Ankara and Moscow 
have created a pattern of simultaneous ri-
valry and cooperation that is now extended 
to Libya. 
Ankara sought this cooperation in 2016, 
although it was primarily Russian inter-
vention that prevented the overthrow of 
the Assad regime sought by Turkey. Turkey 
continued to cooperate with Russia, despite 
the fact that Moscow did not declare either 
the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) or its 
Syrian branch, the Democratic Union Party 
(PYD), a terrorist organisation and despite 
all the pressure put on Assad from the 
Kremlin to take Kurdish concerns into 
account. Ankara remains committed to the 
alliance with Russia, even today as Assad’s 
troops – with overt Russian military sup-
port – attack the last stronghold of the 
Turkey-backed Syrian opposition in Idlib, 
sending huge waves of migrants towards 
the Turkish border. Only the alliance with 
Russia will strengthen its position vis-à-vis 
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the United States and Europe. The same 
applies – beyond all bilateral conflicts of 
interest – for Moscow. 
The Kremlin’s ability to manage conflicts 
and establish cooperation with Ankara 
has provided legitimacy to the Astana pro-
cess – by including Turkey as a representa-
tive of the Syrian opposition – and allowed 
Russia to become the dominant power in 
the Syrian peace process. And it is Moscow’s 
cooperation with Ankara in Libya – con-
cretised in the jointly presented demand 
for a ceasefire – that has made Ankara and 
Moscow legitimate players in the peace pro-
cess, whereas they were previously actors 
circumventing an arms embargo imposed 
by the United Nations. Both states are win-
ning the game at the expense of Western 
players. Ankara’s policy in the eastern 
Mediterranean is also primarily directed 
against Western actors – this time EU 
member states. 
Ankara’s Isolation in the 
Eastern Mediterranean 
On 11 November 2019, the European Coun-
cil decided on a range of possible sanctions 
against Turkish natural and legal persons 
engaged in “illegal exploratory drilling” 
undertaken by Turkish research vessels in 
the internationally recognised Exclusive 
Economic Zone (EEZ) of the Republic of 
Cyprus. The fact that Brussels can now 
actually implement such sanctions has so 
far not impressed the Turkish government. 
The same accounts for an earlier package 
of even softer EU sanctions adopted and 
executed already in July 2019. As part of 
these measures, pre-accession aid has been 
further reduced, negotiations on an avia-
tion agreement suspended, fixed bilateral 
forums suspended, and lending by the 
European Investment Bank restricted. 
In its operations in the eastern Mediter-
ranean, Turkey relies on its navy, which has 
been upgraded in recent years. Its ships not 
only escort Turkish drilling vessels in Cyp-
riot waters, but also take action against 
research vessels of other nations. For exam-
ple, in February 2018, a Turkish naval 
squadron pushed a research platform of 
the Italian energy company ENI out of the 
waters of the EEZ. The same happened in 
the first week of December 2019 to the 
Israeli research vessel Bat Galim, which was 
sailing in the EEZ in agreement with the 
Cypriot government. 
Turkey’s only recourse is to flex its muscle 
because it has isolated itself diplomatically 
in the eastern Mediterranean. The Republic 
of Cyprus has demarcated its EEZ in agree-
ments with Israel, Egypt, and Lebanon (the 
latter deal has not yet been ratified by the 
Lebanese Parliament) on the basis of inter-
national maritime law. Israel had already 
signed a similar agreement in 1996 with the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan on the very 
same legal basis. Greece has gone some way 
to conduct a similar agreement with Egypt 
and is preparing an agreement with Cyprus. 
Turkey, on the other hand, has fallen out 
with all of these states – a Turkish ambas-
sador is still stationed in only one of them, 
Greece. Ankara has not acceded to the Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and 
thus considers null and void the treaties 
that other states have concluded with each 
other on the basis of this convention. It is 
therefore more than understandable that 
Greece, the Republic of Cyprus, Israel, and 
Egypt have established a diplomatic front 
against Turkey. In recent years, they have 
expanded their military cooperation, and 
in January 2019, together with Jordan, 
the Palestinian Authority, and Italy, they 
founded the Eastern Mediterranean Gas 
Forum in Cairo to coordinate the research, 
production, and marketing of gas deposits. 
The EU is threatening Turkey with sanc-
tions. For its part, the United States wel-
comes the cooperation between Israel and 
Greece and is strengthening its military 
presence in the region. 
Turkey’s Engagement in Libya and 
Consequences for Europe 
Against this background, Turkey concluded 
an agreement on 27 November 2019 on the 
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mutual demarcation of continental shelves 
in the Mediterranean and a treaty on mili-
tary cooperation with the embattled Libyan 
Government of National Accord. As early 
as November 2010 – still in the time of 
Muammar al-Gaddafi – Turkey had tried 
to reach an agreement with Libya on the 
limitation of the two countries’ continental 
shelves. From 2018 onwards, Ankara started 
to work on the issue again, taking advan-
tage this time of the precarious situation of 
the Libyan government. However, Tripoli 
resisted Turkey’s demand until November 
2019. It gave in only on the condition that a 
military assistance agreement be concluded 
simultaneously. 
The Libyan-Turkish treaty for the de-
marcation of the continental shelves only 
defines a relatively short borderline south-
east of Crete, but it harbours enormous 
explosive power. For the first time, Turkey 
has succeeded in agreeing with a neigh-
bouring state on a border in the eastern 
Mediterranean, which undoubtedly in-
creases the legitimacy of Turkey’s position 
and has the potential to weaken the posi-
tions of Cyprus, Greece, and Israel. What 
is more, the treaty is based on the thesis, 
which has so far only been advocated by 
Turkey, that islands do not have their own 
continental shelf and therefore cannot 
establish their own EEZs. This calls into 
question not only the EEZ of the Republic 
of Cyprus, but also the status of the Greek 
islands, in particular Crete – a status that 
is recognised by all other neighbouring 
countries. In Ankara’s eyes, the agreement 
with Libya entitles Turkey to become active 
south-east of Crete in waters that will be 
part of the Greek EEZ once an agreement 
between Athens and Nicosia is signed. Tur-
key is already stating that the EastMed 
pipeline – planned by Greece, the Repub-
lic of Cyprus, and Israel, and foreseen to 
run south-east of Crete – can now only 
be realised with Ankara’s consent. Ankara 
will make every effort to bring Israel, Egypt, 
Lebanon, and Syria in line with its own 
interpretation. To achieve this, Turkey will 
point out that all these states would see an 
enlargement of their (potential) EEZs if they 
were to align with the Turkish position and 
deny islands the ability to establish EEZs. 
The immediate effect of the two Turkish-
Libyan agreements and of the ensuing de-
ployment of Turkish soldiers and Syrian 
fighters to Libya has been a rise in tensions, 
both in Libya and in the eastern Mediterra-
nean. In Libya, the fighting has intensified. 
In the eastern Mediterranean, where France 
and Egypt had held joint military exercises 
before, the new situation has triggered joint 
naval manoeuvres by France, Italy, and 
Cyprus as well as by Russia and Syria, in 
addition to a maritime arms show by Egypt. 
Turkey is determined to assert its posi-
tions – there is no doubt about that. An-
kara is upgrading its navy. In the next three 
years alone, it will put 20 more ships into 
service. Unlike its policy in Syria, the AKP’s 
policy in the eastern Mediterranean is 
receiving great levels of support in the mili-
tary and security bureaucracy of Turkey. 
The European Union and NATO must pre-
pare themselves for Russian-Turkish co-
operation to be deepened, consolidated, 
and extended to the eastern Mediterranean. 
The thrust of future Turkish foreign policy 
is likely to be directed primarily towards 
two EU members: Greece and the Republic 
of Cyprus. More than ever before, the EU 
is being called upon to develop a coherent 
Turkey policy. Brussels must clearly show 
Ankara that there is a European threshold 
of pain. However, Brussels should also 
make offers to cooperate with Turkey, such 
as modernising the customs union with the 
EU and/or mediating the dispute over gas in 
the Mediterranean. Otherwise, Turkey has 
little to lose by further escalating the con-
flict in the eastern Mediterranean. 
Dr Günter Seufert is Head of the Centre for Applied Turkey Studies (CATS) at SWP. 
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